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Four years have passed since the government of Colombia, under former president Juan Manuel Santos, signed a peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia - People’s Army, also known as FARC-EP 
(OACP, 2016). For decades, the armed conflict had 
shaped Colombian society, culture, politics, and 
the natural environment. The list of committed 
violations of human rights as well as international 
humanitarian law (IHL) is long, and includes forced 
displacement of millions of people, the recruitment 
of minors to join the ranks of guerrilla groups, 
planting of landmines, and killing tens of thousands 
of civilians. In addition to the unspeakable social 
impact, the armed conflict affected the environment, 
and inevitably also the people in it, in various neg-
ative ways; for example, deforestation caused by 
illegal mining and coca plantations (Negret et al., 
2019; Dávalos et al., 2011), mercury pollution of 
watersheds from illegal gold mining (Guevara et 
al., 2016; Wagner, 2016), aerial fumigation of coca 
crops and accidental fumigation of other crops 
with glyphosate, and pollution of soils and river 
from disruption of oil pipelines. Recent progressive 
developments taking place in the international 
legal arena, spurred by increasing awareness of 
the negative environmental impact on local com-
munities, have called for actions to address and 
repair environmental damage, even if not legally 
required under international law. 
While the peace agreement allowed Co-
lombia to seek reconciliation within society, the 
armed conflict and its complex socio-political and 
social-ecological impacts reverberate into the pres-
ent, and environmental degradation, particularly 
deforestation, gains pace and becomes increasingly 
widespread and severe, particularly in the areas pre-
viously controlled by the FARC (Murillo Sandoval et 
al., 2020; Clerici et al., 2020). Colombia’s indigenous 
peoples, who have been disproportionally affected 
by the armed conflict (Springer, 2012; IFRC, 2020), 
are also affected by the Colombian peacebuilding 
projects which bring new dimensions to the recog-
nition of their rights over territory and resources as 
well as the role of indigenous people in the future 
of environmental protection (Krause, 2020; Krause 
et al., 2020). These aspects need to be addressed in 
the peace process to ensure an ecologically as well 
as socially sustainable peace, in which international 
law can play an important role.
This policy brief aims at assessing the impact 
of the armed conflict in Colombia on the environ-
ment and on indigenous peoples, and the applica-
tion of the rules of IHL and international criminal law 
to the armed conflict as well as their implications 
for the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and for 
international criminal justice. Section 1 discusses 
the implications of the armed conflict as well as 
the peacebuilding process for indigenous peoples’ 
rights and environmental protection in Colombia 
and provides a brief background to the creation 
of the JEP. In this section we also include a brief 
case study of the impact of the armed conflict on 
the protection of the environment in the Putumayo 
department. Section 2 provides a background to 
the rules of international law relevant to internal 
armed conflicts and their application in the pro-
tection of the environment and natural resource 
conservation, with references to the situation in 
Colombia. It also discusses how far international 
law can be applied to build sustainable peace and 
development in post-conflict scenarios. Section 
3 starts by discussing the four core internation-
al crimes under the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) Statute and how they relate to environmental 
protection and natural resource governance in 
the context of the conflict in Colombia. It also 
discusses the potential role for non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and civil society in Colombia 
to bring communications before the ICC Office 
of the Prosecutor (OTP) for the protection of the 
environment and the rights of indigenous peoples. 
The final section summarises the findings and 
presents further recommendations.
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Nature Conservation, Indigenous 
Peoples, and Peacebuilding Processes in 
Colombia
The Colombian armed conflict was mostly a rural 
conflict, taking place in the marginal rural zones of 
the country. During the armed conflict three types of 
organized violence took place: intra-state violence 
between armed groups and the state, non-state 
violence between the different armed groups, and 
one-sided violence where armed groups targeted 
civilians (UCDP, 2020). Human rights violations during 
the armed conflict were widespread and committed 
by all sides, and included massacres of civilians, 
targeted assassinations such as the infamous falsos 
positivos scandal that involved the state military 
and police, and the deployment of anti-personnel 
mines across the Colombian countryside. The ex-
tensive violence affected millions of people, many 
of which were forcibly displaced in the process and 
migrated to urban centres in search for security 
and a better safer life (Beittel, 2015). The internal 
migrations affected the social fabric of ‘receiving’ 
cities, leading to widespread informal settlements 
characterized by people living in poverty.
Colombia is a country of remarkable bio-cul-
tural diversity, having outstanding biological diver-
sity (WWF-Colombia, 2017) and 115 recognized in-
digenous and Afro-Colombian groups that make up 
an estimated 4.4% of the population (DANE, 2019). 
However, half of the country’s indigenous reserves 
or resguardos are located in the 150 municipalities 
most affected by forced displacements, which 
means indigenous peoples and their territories 
have been greatly impacted by the armed conflict 
(Arango, 2017). Many indigenous communities 
suffered violence at the hands of guerrilla groups, 
paramilitaries and the state’s security forces when 
their territories were turned into battlefields for 
military action and targeted for exploitation of 
the natural resources that provided a source of 
income for the various armed groups and para-
militaries (Beittel, 2015; Rodríguez, 2016; Guevara 
et al., 2016). Moreover, during the armed conflict, 
indigenous people were at a significantly higher 
risk of forced recruitment due to the intensification 
of armed confrontations in their territories, which 
overlap with strategic corridors used by armed 
groups and with resource exploitation. For instance, 
by some estimates, an indigenous child was 674 
times more likely to be recruited by an illegal armed 
group than a minor in any other part of the country 
(Springer, 2012; UNSC, 2012).
Environmental destruction and degradation 
were other results of Colombia’s armed conflict. 
During the armed conflict illegal coca crops re-
placed natural forests and its processing to cocaine 
also polluted rivers and soils (Dávalos et al., 2011; 
EJOLT, 2017). Moreover, the state’s response to 
eradicate coca plantations via aerial fumigation 
with glyphosate herbicide created additional pol-
lution causing environmental degradation of native 
ecosystems and non-coca crops as well as health 
problems for local populations (Sadinsky & Campos 
Iriarte, 2019; Dávalos et al., 2011; EJOLT, 2017). After 
discontinuing areal fumigation in 2015, the govern-
ment of Colombia decided to resume the practice 
to eradicate coca plantations despite critique from 
farmers and civil society groups (Reuters, 2020).
Gold mining was an important source of in-
come for illegal groups and caused widespread 
mercury pollution of rivers and watersheds, a prac-
tice that continues to this day (Rodríguez & Rubiano 
Galvis, 2016; Guevara et al., 2016; Wagner, 2016). 
The rivers and fish in the Colombian Amazon region 
contain high levels of mercury from alluvial gold 
damaging not only the ecosystem but also causing 
high health hazards in human populations and 
particularly in indigenous groups who rely on fish as 
a main staple food (Nuñez-Avellaneda et al., 2014). 
This connection between environmental damage 
and the impact on human health becomes obvious 
in the case of mercury pollution from gold mining in 
Colombia. For instance, the levels of mercury found 
in fish in the municipality of Puerto Leguizamo in 
Putumayo were the highest across the Colombian 
Amazon, exceeding the thresholds considered 
safe for human consumption (Nuñez-Avellaneda 
et al., 2014).
Another important source of environmental 
pollution are guerrilla attacks on oil pipelines (in 
particular by the ELN). During the armed conflict 
destruction of oil infrastructure was frequently 
used as a weapon to disrupt economic activities 
and target the state which led to an estimated 
more than 3 million barrels of crude oil seeping 
into Colombian soil and rivers. Attacks against oil 
infrastructure also continue to date and are used as 
a political weapon, particularly in the north-eastern 
Caño Limon-Coveñas pipeline and the southern 
Transandino pipeline that passes from the Putumayo 
department to the port city of Tumaco in Nariño 
(Pardo Ibarra, 2018). The Putumayo department 
has been most affected by these and by 2018 
it had registered 1,109 targeted attacks (Pardo 
Ibarra, 2018).
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The Unintended Consequences of 
the Peace Agreement: Environmental 
Degradation and Indigenous 
People’s Territories as Contemporary 
Victims of the Conflict
Since the FARC’s disarmament, it became increas-
ingly clear that the group exercised a de-facto state 
authority with rules and regulations in the territories 
previously under its control (Murillo Sandoval et 
al., 2020; Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2019; 
Betancur-Alarcón & Krause, 2020). Although it may 
seem from an international perspective that the 
Colombian armed conflict with the FARC has come 
to an end, hostilities continue with FARC dissident 
and other guerrilla groups as well as armed gangs 
and drug cartels. Most noticeably, intimidations and 
violence against human and indigenous rights ac-
tivists and environmental defenders has increased. 
Since the peace agreement was signed, hundreds 
of social and indigenous leaders, environmental de-
fenders and human rights activists have been killed 
in Colombia (UNHCHR, 2020). Implementation of 
the peace agreement goes against the interests of 
some landholders and drug traffickers, and, there-
fore, social leaders working on the implementation 
of the peace accords, promoting the agreement’s 
comprehensive rural reform or the substitution of 
coca for other crops are increasingly threatened 
and assassinated (Ramírez, 2019). Between January 
2017 and June 2018, 36 coca growers seeking 
to substitute coca with other crops were killed 
(Ramírez, 2019). The unceasing violence against 
social leaders has earned Colombia the inglorious 
2nd and 3rd places respectively, among the countries 
with the highest number of assassinations of human 
right defenders, and of social and environmental 
leaders in the past four years (Global Witness, 2019; 
Global Witness, 2017; UN, 2020).
While the armed conflict led to significant 
environmental damage and degradation, the 
post-conflict transition has brought a sharp rise 
in environmental degradation, even encroaching 
in areas such as national parks that were previ-
ously better protected. Due to continuous threats 
from FARC dissident groups, the National Parks 
authority has had to withdraw their park rangers 
from several protected areas such as the Rio Puré, 
Apaporis, Serranía de Chiribiquete, La Paya, Sier-
ra de la Macarena, Tinigua and Picachos Natural 
Parks, leaving these areas without the presence 
of any environmental law enforcement authori-
ty (Colprensa, 2020). Deforestation in Colombia 
soared in expectation of the peace agreement 
and since its ratification (GFW, 2019; Clerici et al., 
2020; Negret et al., 2019; Armenteras et al., 2018; 
Prem et al., 2018).
There is strong spatial overlap between those 
areas that record high levels of violence and those 
that exhibit illegal conversion of forests to agricul-
tural land uses, cattle pastures, and coca plantations 
(Murillo Sandoval et al., 2020; Clerici et al., 2020; 
Negret et al., 2019; Prem et al., 2018). The Amazon 
frontier departments of Colombia in particular are 
experiencing a sharp rise in deforestation (Clerici 
et al., 2020), which has already affected recognized 
indigenous territories, for instance the Resguardo 
Indígena Nukak-Maku in Guaviare and the Resguar-
do Indígena Llanos del Yarí – Yaguará II in Caquetá. 
These two indigenous reserves have already lost 
an estimated 4,000 ha of primary forests, and de-
forestation through illegal land claims is a threat 
for many more indigenous reserves across the 
Amazon region (Finer & Mamani, 2020).
Illegal land grabbing has become the main 
driver of deforestation in Colombia, most acutely 
in the Amazon region’s frontier departments of 
Putumayo, Caquetá, and Guaviare. These land grabs 
are financed by large landowners, who seek to use 
the current void and absence of state control to 
expand their land holdings by cutting down large 
stretches of forests (Murillo Sandoval et al., 2020; 
Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2019). Unfor-
tunately, the peace process must be considered 
an unintended instrument of land grabbing and 
illegal land markets (Murillo Sandoval et al., 2020), 
which is fuelled by the highly unequal access to, 
and control of land. In Colombia, a small share 
of landowners possesses most of the agricultural 
lands. This unequal distribution was, ironically, 
perpetuated by armed groups during the conflict 
due to the violent displacements of small-scale 
farmers, and it has now further increased in the 
aftermath of the peace agreement (Guereña, 2017).
The Special Jurisdiction for Peace 
and Colombia’s Indigenous Groups
In 2016, Colombia was the first country to negoti-
ate a peace agreement which had to respect the 
obligations of the ICC Statute. During the peace 
negotiations, former president Santos and the FARC’s 
peace negotiators agreed upon the creation of a 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace (in Spanish Jurisdic-
ción Especial para la Paz-JEP), which is a parallel 
legal system and tribunal dedicated to resolving 
cases involving former combatants, state agents 
as well as civilians participating in the hostilities. 
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The creation of JEP paves the way for national 
reconciliation based on restorative justice and 
forms part of the transitional justice component 
of the Peace Agreement (Comprehensive System 
of Truth, Justice, Reparations and Guarantees of 
Non-Recurrence). Through JEP Colombia follows 
international standards of justice which means it 
cannot offer judicial pardons for gross human rights 
violations and war crimes that took place during the 
armed conflict. In addition to investigating crimes 
committed by the FARC, JEP investigates crimes by 
the State, for instance the military, which carried out 
some of the worst atrocities of the armed conflict 
under former president Uribe. 
Regarding indigenous people, JEP includes, 
inter alia, a special ethnic commission (Comisión 
Étnica) and a special territorial and environmental 
commission (Comisión Territorial y Ambiental). 
JEP has three open territorial cases1 that relate to 
the violation of human rights perpetrated against 
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. An 
additional important recognition took place in 2019 
when JEP formally recognized the environment as 
a ‘silent victim’ of the Colombian armed conflict, 
albeit this recognition is geographically limited to 
three municipalities in the department of Nariño 
(Tumaco, Barbacoas and Ricaurte) within Case 02 
(JEP, 2018).
Case Study: The Putumayo – Human  
and Indigenous Rights Violations During 
Colombia’s Armed Conflict Continue into  
the Post-Conflict Transition
The Putumayo department, in the South of 
Colombia, stretches from the Andean Cor-
dillera eastwards into the Amazon rainforest, 
bordered by Ecuador and Peru to the South. 
The Putumayo department exemplified the 
complexity of Colombia’s armed conflict and 
large part of the department has long been 
under the de-facto rule of the FARC guerrilla 
(fronts 32 and 48) and paramilitary armies 
because it was a major producer of coca 
during the armed conflict (Ramírez, 2011). 
Nonetheless, Putumayo was and continues to 
be a major oil producing region in Colombia. 
Furthermore, the department is the most 
affected by attacks against oil pipelines and 
1 Case 02 - Territorial Situation of the Tumaco, Ricaurte, 
and Barbacoas Municipalities (Nariño): Case 04 
- Territorial Situation in the Urabá Region: Case 
05 - Territorial Situation of the Northern Cauca and 
Southern Cauca Valley Regions.
infrastructure in Colombia, with an estimated 
1,100 attack events (Pardo Ibarra, 2018). 
Moreover, because Putumayo had high 
conflict intensity during the armed conflict, 
forced recruitment of children, in particular in-
digenous children, was also widespread in the 
department (UNSC, 2012). While Putumayo is 
home to only 0.71% of Colombia’s population, 
40% of its population are victims of the armed 
conflict, which reside in the department 
(Unidad de Víctimas, 2020b). The national 
registry of victims (Unidad para la Atención y 
la Reparación Integral a las Víctimas) recorded 
approximately 136,000 victims of the armed 
conflict in the Putumayo region (Unidad de 
Víctimas, 2020b) and about 253,000 forcibly 
displaced people up until 2019—which could 
be double (Unidad de Víctimas, 2020a).
At present, Putumayo serves as a show-
case for the clash between an expansionist 
and primary resources dependent economic 
development agenda promoted by the State 
(DNP, 2018) and local rights to access and use 
of natural resources (CNMH, 2015). Putumayo 
is exemplary of many other peripheral regions 
of Colombia where clashes between rival 
armed groups and the state trying to seize 
control has led to the militarization of every-
day life (Ramírez, 2019; Nilsson & González 
Marín, 2020; Meger & Sachseder, 2020). 
A characteristic Putumayo shares with 
other departments is the high level of infor-
mal land holdings, which was supposed to 
be addressed through the Comprehensive 
Rural Reform as part of the Peace Agreement. 
However, rural reform advances slowly at best 
(Kroc Institute, 2019), and the recognition of 
land rights and the provision of security for 
local populations and indigenous groups con-
tinue to be major issues in Putumayo (Ortiz, 
2020). There are multiple accounts of oil and 
mining concessions overlapping with recog-
nized and claimed indigenous territories (CCJ, 
2019), giving rise to new tensions and con-
flicts and rights violations (Rodríguez, 2016). 
The appearance of new armed actors in Putu-
mayo is a continuous source of violence and 
forced displacement of local peasants and 
people belonging to indigenous ethnicities 
(Ortiz, 2020).
The case of Putumayo exemplifies the 
complexity of Colombia’s armed conflict 
and current peacebuilding efforts, notably in 
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relation to the environment and indigenous 
peoples’ rights. The process of reconciliation 
and the peacebuilding project in Putumayo 
must account for the past violence and crimes 
committed towards its civilian population, but 
particularly, it must recognize the impact on 
the regions’ indigenous groups and their terri-
tories. JEP can be an important mechanism to 
address the environmental destruction related 
to the armed conflict by contributing to legal 
restoration for victims but also to advance 
laws on environmental protection during and 
after the armed conflict.
Armed Conflicts, Peacebuilding  
and Nature Conservation under 
International Law 
From an international legal perspective, environ-
mental damage occurring in relation to armed 
conflict lacks comprehensive protection, and appli-
cable rules and principles may be found in different 
branches of international law. IHL is the branch of 
international law specifically designed to regulate 
warfare and it is applied as lex specialis in times 
of armed conflict. This means that IHL rules may 
prevail above the rules from other more general 
branches of international law that also apply in 
peacetime, such as international environmental 
law and human rights law. As the IHL rules lack 
adequate environmental protection, environmental 
protection could be lawfully halted during armed 
conflict. Furthermore, most of the rules of IHL only 
apply in the context of international armed conflicts 
involving two or more sovereign states2 and not 
in internal armed conflict, such as the Colombian 
one. However, common article 3 of the four Geneva 
Conventions3 and the 1977 Additional Protocol II to 
2 For instance, the twelve Hague Conventions from 1899 
and1906, the Geneva Gas Protocol from 1925 and the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are only applicable 
in international armed conflicts.
3 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 
75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva 
Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 
the four Geneva Conventions,4 which apply during 
internal armed conflicts, contain some basic rules 
but are not applicable to environmental damage. 
Colombia has been party to both the four Geneva 
Conventions and the Additional Protocol II since 
1995.5 Through practice, in particular by the inter-
national criminal courts, hybrid criminal courts and 
national courts, the application of many IHL rules 
have also been extended to internal armed conflicts 
as customary international law. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has confirmed 
this trend in its humanitarian customary law study 
of 2005 by acknowledging that most customary 
humanitarian legal rules are considered applicable 
to both international and internal armed conflicts 
(Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005). Important 
differences persist between these two types of 
armed conflicts, such as combatant privileges with 
lawful rights to use lethal violence in accordance 
with IHL which are only relevant in international 
armed conflicts (Akande, 2012). Still, authorities in 
power are encouraged by article 5(6) Additional 
Protocol II to grant amnesty to persons that have 
participated in internal armed conflicts (if they have 
respected IHL rules).
IHL rules are deemed inadequate in address-
ing environmental concerns (Sjöstedt, 2020; Fleck, 
2017; Fleck, 2013; Bothe, 2010). Historically, IHL has 
not been concerned with environmental protection 
and only in the aftermath of the Vietnam War has 
wartime environmental damage received interna-
tional attention as warranting specific protection. 
The intentional targeting of the environment as 
part of the US warfare in Vietnam, which includ-
ed the extensive use of Agent Orange, showed 
how this damage led to long-term implications 
not only on the environment itself but also on 
public health, resulting in birth defects, cancer, 
and other health problems (Westing, 2012). As 
a result, the ENMOD Convention6 and the 1977 
Additional Protocol I were adopted. The ENMOD 
UNTS 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287. 
4 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 
June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609.
5 See the ICRC website, https://ihl-atabases.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.
xsp?xp_countrySelected=CO
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Convention has a restricted application scope as 
it only prohibits the modification of environmen-
tal forces as a weapon and does not protect the 
environment as such. These types of modification 
techniques are rarely employed during armed 
conflict. Thus, it adds little to environmental pro-
tection in relation to the Colombian conflict. The 
1977 Additional Protocol I included two specific 
environmental provisions, namely articles 35(3) 
and 55 protecting the natural environment from 
‘widespread, long-term and severe damage’. It 
remains unclear what type of damage this refers 
to but evidently the provision only protects against 
extreme environmental destruction. So far, articles 
35(3) and 55 have never been applied in any con-
crete case despite numerous armed conflicts that 
have caused massive environmental damage, and 
up to now there is no agreed definition of what 
constitutes ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ 
damage. Even though the Additional Protocol I—as 
opposed to Additional Protocol II—only applies to 
international armed conflicts, it could be argued 
that a similar level of protection should also apply 
in times of internal armed conflicts as customary 
international law (ICRC, 2020b; UNGA, 2019).7 In 
this context, JEP could contribute to the definition 
of widespread, long-term and severe damage by 
applying these articles as customary law in relation 
to the Colombian conflict. In Case 02,8 in which 
the environment has already been confirmed as a 
victim of the conflict, the multiple actions that have 
been carried out that intentionally, accidentally, or 
negligently cause damage and alterations to the 
environment, with temporary or permanent impact, 
could be regarded as part of this definition. Such 
interpretation would capture a contemporary view 
of the environment that takes into account scientific 
knowledge on how destruction of ecosystems 
can have unforeseeable consequences that can 
accelerate when exacerbated by climate change. 
General rules of IHL protecting civilians and 
civilian objects also provide environmental protec-
tion during armed conflict. These rules consist of 
the rule of military necessity as well as the principles 
Techniques of 18 May 1977: 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 (ENMOD 
Convention).
7 See ICRC (2020b), Rules 1, 2 and particularly 13 
encouraging parties to non-international armed conflict 
to apply specific environmental protection obligations; 
see also Draft Principle 13 of the Draft Report of 
the International Commission (2019) (UN Doc. A/
CN.4/L.930/Add.1). 
8 Case 02 - Territorial Situation of the Tumaco, Ricaurte, 
and Barbacoas Municipalities (Nariño).
of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. They 
apply in international as well as internal armed 
conflicts. The general rules are an important cor-
nerstone as the environment is presumed to be 
civilian in character (ICRC, 2020b). Tangible parts 
of the environment, such as forests, fields, rivers, 
farmland, animals, crops, and freshwater resources 
as well as environmental components of more 
abstract character, including the atmosphere, eco-
systems, ozone layer, or biodiversity are protected 
from direct attacks, as long as they do not repre-
sent ‘military objectives’ (Sjöstedt, 2020). A military 
objective is defined as an object that if destroyed 
or captured ‘offers a definite military advantage’.9 
A military advantage means that the attack must 
weaken the military forces of the enemy based on 
the available information at the time of the attack. 
Therefore, the environment, or a part of it, can 
become a military objective depending on the 
circumstances. For instance, a river that is used for 
military transport and communication or a protect-
ed area used as a hiding place could become a 
military target (Sjöstedt, 2013). In addition, even 
when the environment is protected as a civilian 
object under the general rules of IHL, a substantial 
amount of collateral damage is permitted as long 
as it does not outweigh the military advantage 
anticipated at the time for an attack in accordance 
with the proportionality principle. Moreover, in case 
of launching an attack the feasible precautionary 
measures must be undertaken to minimise harm 
to the environment (Sjöstedt, 2020). 
The legality assessment under the principles 
of proportionality and precaution may be tricky, in 
particular if a long time has passed since the attack. 
For instance, an oil pipeline may constitute a military 
objective and attacking it, even if it leads to an oil 
spill of more than 3 million barrels into Colombian 
soils and rivers, could be regarded as lawful as long 
as the damage is proportionate in comparison to 
the military advantage. Here again, JEP could choose 
an evolutionary interpretation of the rules of IHL that 
considers international environmental law. Even 
if IHL rules have precedence over international 
environmental law, environmental legal principles 
could still inform the application of IHL and require 
parties to an armed conflict to take precautions to 
avoid certain types of environmental damage. These 
precautions could consist of the attacker having to 
collect data on the environmental surroundings 
9 See in article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I for the full 
definition. 
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in order to map out rivers, underground aquifers, 
sensitive environmental areas, and endangered 
species that may be threatened by the military 
activities (Sjöstedt, 2020; Hulme, 2010). Rule 44 of 
the Customary Law Study by the ICRC stated in fact 
that the lack of scientific certainty with regards to 
the environmental effects of a military operation 
does not absolve a party in a conflict from taking all 
feasible precautions (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 
2005).10 In the Colombian armed conflict, the par-
ties would have obligations to collect information 
on how to avoid or minimise leakages if attacking a 
target containing crude oil, to consider alternative 
weaponry that reduces the risk of environmental 
damage, to avoid protected areas, etc. (Sjöstedt, 
2020; Droege & Tougas 2013; Hulme, 2005). This 
could also include considerations regarding fu-
ture generations. Such a reading of the general 
protection rules could be applied in Case 02 and 
Case 0511 to prevent IHL rules from permitting 
environmental damage that has adverse and uncer-
tain consequences that could even be irreparable. 
JEP could help clarify the vagueness of the rules 
relating to environmental protection under IHL and, 
thereby, strengthen protection.
Besides the general rules of protection, the 
environment is indirectly protected under other IHL 
rules, such as the protection of objects indispens-
able for the civilians’ survival.12 In an armed conflict, 
the attack, destruction, or removal of ‘food-stuffs, 
agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, 
crops, livestock, drinking water installations and 
supplies and irrigation works’13 is prohibited. As 
most of these objects are all dependant on a fertile 
and healthy environment, the articles indirectly 
protect the environment as well and materialise 
the notion of human dependence on the environ-
ment (Sjöstedt, 2020). The protection of objects 
indispensable to civilians prohibits practices like 
targeting water supply systems and crops with the 
intention of denying them their use. The increasingly 
recognised right to a healthy environment may also 
have implication on how rules protecting objects 
10 The ICRC combined the precautionary approach 
originating from international environmental law with 
the principle of precaution under IHL in Rule 44 in the 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Study. 
11 Case 05 - Territorial Situation of the Northern Cauca 
and Southern Cauca Valley Regions.
12 See Article 54 Additional Protocol I and Article 14 of 
Protocol II.
13 This list is included in the more detailed article 54 of 
the Additional Protocol I but is likely to apply to similar 
objects in a non-international armed conflict. 
indispensable to civilian populations should be 
applied. Furthermore, there are specific obliga-
tions under international law to minimise their 
indiscriminate effects also to the environment.14 
Furthermore, Colombia has an obligation to 
remove landmines as soon as possible according to 
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention15 to which 
it is party. Such an effort to clear areas contaminated 
with mines could be an important step to ensure the 
safe return to the territory of civilians and pave the 
way for the peace process. This obligation applies 
also to indigenous territories, although remedial 
measures need to be undertaken with prior con-
sultation and in cooperation with the concerned 
indigenous population according to Draft Principle 
5(2) adopted by the International law Commission. 
Furthermore, Colombia is under the obligation to 
safeguard the special relationship that indigenous 
peoples have with their environment.16 Draft Prin-
ciple 5 has helped advance customary international 
law to ensure the protection of the environment, 
of indigenous land, and also the participation of 
indigenous people in the peace process to restore 
land. The involvement of indigenous peoples in 
JEP is an important step towards confirming the 
importance of respecting indigenous rights in times 
of armed conflict as well as in the post-conflict. This 
involvement may also be important to the protection 
of the environment as such in a post-conflict setting 
because territories inhabited by indigenous peoples 
are often better protected from environmentally 
harmful activities, even better than protected areas 
managed by states (IPBES, 2019; Sjöstedt, 2019). 
Many states agree that there are important 
indications to advocate for stronger environmental 
protection in relation to armed conflicts. However, 
given the complexity and unwillingness of states to 
re-negotiate IHL rules, it is unlikely that a new legal 
instrument will be adopted to enhance environmen-
tal protection in warfare. Therefore, case law plays 
a key role to improve and develop protection by 
applying a progressive interpretation of the existing 
rules. The environment is consistently being referred 
to as a victim by the international community, most 
14 See Rule 24 ICRC Environmental Guidelines.
15 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and 
on their Destruction, 18 September 1997.
16 See the Advisory Opinion of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(2007).
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recently by the President of the ICRC who stated 
in the foreword to the new ICRC Environmental 
Guidelines that ‘[t]he environment can no longer 
remain a silent casualty of war’ (ICRC, 2020b). The 
view that the environment can be a legal subject 
with rights has already been confirmed in several 
court cases in Colombia. The Supreme Court of 
Justice recognized the Amazon as an entity subject 
to rights in 2018. The decision was based on the 
principles of solidarity and intergenerational equity 
which are considered as international customary 
environmental legal principles.17 It is therefore 
natural that the environment be recognised as 
a victim. In this regard, JEP has an opportunity to 
actually make a significant contribution to what 
being a victim actually means for the environment 
in Case 02. Also, human rights law and international 
environmental law could be helpful to provide a 
further international legal basis to address the 
environment. These bodies of law have adopted 
a more profound perception of environmental 
protection that contemplates the importance of 
ensuring a healthy environment for longer than just 
the immediate moment during and after an attack 
in order to fulfil fundamental and absolute rights 
such as the right to life. Even though IHL prevails 
as lex specialis, international human rights law as 
well as international environmental law still apply 
during armed conflict and can complement IHL. 
For instance, the human right to water could have 
implications on the legality of acts that have led 
to the pollution of ground water and rivers, such 
as blowing up oil pipelines or releasing mercury 
in connection with gold extraction, even if the acts 
are not prohibited under IHL. Even if human rights 
law is not applicable to non-state actors such as 
the FARC, there is increasing advocacy for the case 
of non-state actors who control territory and carry 
out de facto state functions to be bound by human 
rights law (Hulme, 2017). JEP could apply human 
rights law in the FARC-controlled areas to address 
acts that are not dealt with in IHL rules but cause 
environmental damage that have substantial impact 
for local populations in violation of their human 
rights. In relation to the armed conflict in Colombia, 
such an interpretation could prohibit the blowing 
up of oil pipelines, spraying with glyphosate, illicit 
crops, illegal logging, illegal mining, bombing, 
17 Also, in ruling T-622-16 of the Constitutional Court, 
the Atrato river was recognized as a legal subject with 
rights to protection and restoration by the Colombian 
State and the ethnic communities.
hunting animals, and setting up camps or open 
trails in protected areas.
The International Criminal Court 
Jurisdiction, the Environment and the 
Armed Conflict in Colombia 
The IHL rules discussed above do not in themselves 
provide the basis for international criminal liability 
of individuals, which is dependent on the codifica-
tion of those rules as international crimes, such as 
war crimes. International crimes are coupled with 
universal jurisdiction meaning that an individual 
committing such crimes can be tried by any domes-
tic criminal court. They also fall under the jurisdiction 
of an international criminal court or tribunal, such 
as the International Criminal Court (ICC). The four 
crimes that currently fall under the jurisdiction of 
the ICC are genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and the crime of aggression (ICC, 1998, art 
5). Therefore, at present the scope for the prosecu-
tion of environmental crimes before the ICC is very 
limited, given that the Rome Statute (ICC, 1998)18 
primarily only recognises the court’s jurisdiction 
for certain instances of environmental damage in 
the context of an armed conflict falling under the 
definition of war crimes. It should be noted that 
Colombia ratified the Rome Statute on 5 August 
2002 and upon ratification it declared that it would 
not accept the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect 
to war crimes for a period of seven years from the 
date of ratification, that is, it would only accept the 
court’s jurisdiction for war crimes committed after 
1 November 2009 (ICC-OTP, 2012). This means that 
the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity 
and genocide committed in Colombian territory 
or by its nationals since 1 November 2002, and for 
war crimes from 1 November 2009 onwards (ibid).
In 2016, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
published a policy paper on case selection and 
prioritization which highlighted the inclination of 
the OTP to prosecute international crimes involving 
illegal natural resource exploitation, land grabbing 
and environmental damage (ICC-OTP, 2016, paras. 
7, 40 & 41). However, the OTP policy paper could 
not expand the court’s jurisdiction over environ-
mental crimes or ‘ecocide’ which is dependent 
on an amendment to the ICC Statute by the state 
parties and the policy paper is only an internal 
18 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last 
amended 2010), 17 July 1998.
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policy document. Still, the OTP policy paper is highly 
significant in that it emphasises the seriousness of 
environmental damage in the context of the existing 
crimes under the Rome Statute as part of the OTP’s 
policy of case selection and prioritisation (Pereira, 
2020; Mistura, 2018). In particular, it recognises 
that land grabbing, illegal exploitation of natural 
resources and destruction of the environment are 
a ‘serious crime under national law.’ (ICC-OTP, 2016, 
para. 7) (emphasis added). It also states that ‘the 
Office will give particular consideration to pros-
ecuting Rome Statute crimes’ (emphasis added) 
that are committed through the ‘destruction of 
the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources or the illegal dispossession of land’ (ibid).
The ICC OTP 2016 Policy Paper guides the 
prosecutor to assess the gravity of the crime as a 
key case selection criterion in ‘a given situation’ 
which should reflect a ‘concern to the international 
community as a whole’ (ibid, para. 35). In partic-
ular, the factors that will guide the ICC prosecutor 
include the ‘scale, nature, manner of commission, 
and impact of crimes’ (ibid, paras. 32 & 37). The 
way a crime was committed is to be assessed, inter 
alia, on whether it results in ‘the destruction of the 
environment or protected objects’ (ibid, para. 41). 
This suggests that the ICC prosecutor’s discretion 
is not absolute. Indeed, it is in the assessment of 
the gravity of the offence that the ICC Prosecutor’s 
2016 Policy Paper will prove to be particularly 
influential, given the emphasis that it places on 
crimes committed by means of, or resulting in, 
the ‘destruction of the environment’ and leading 
to ‘environmental damage inflicted on affected 
communities’ as particularly serious crimes (ibid, 
paras. 13-14). However, the impact of the ICC OTP 
2016 Policy Paper is likely to be limited as it is only 
‘an internal document of the Office and, as such, 
it does not give rise to legal rights’ (ibid, para. 2). 
The situation in Colombia has been under 
preliminary examination by the OTP since June 
2004.19 The OTP has received over 229 national 
communications pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute in relation to the situation in Colombia (ICC-
OTP, 2018). However, to date the OTP has not started 
investigations relating to the situation in Colombia 
due to the application of the complementarity 
principle, that is, the ICC should only exercise its 
jurisdiction when States are unable or unwilling to 
19 For a list of all cases currently under preliminary 
examinations by the OTP, see: https://www.icc-cpi.int/
pages/pe.aspx [1/12/ 2020].
prosecute (ICC, 1998, Preamble, para. 10 & art. 1). 
So far—and particularly after the creation of JEP in 
2016—the OTP is satisfied that JEP and the Colombian 
courts are demonstrating a willingness and ability 
to bring to justice the state and non-state actors 
linked to the armed conflict in Colombia in line 
with the standards and principles of international 
criminal law.20 This situation may change, however, 
in light of political developments and the ongoing 
operational activities of JEP.21 In addition, the OTP 
has expressed concerns regarding the compatibility 
of the legislation implemented in the creation of JEP 
with the Rome Statute and customary international 
law.22 Despite this, the current ICC Prosecutor, Ms. 
Fatou Bensouda, has recently announced that the 
OTP was considering ending its ongoing preliminary 
examinations on the situation in Colombia ‘subject 
to certain benchmarks being fulfilled’.23
20 See ICC-OTP (2019) Report on Preliminary Examinations. 
The OTP noted in 2019 that ‘The Colombian authorities 
appear to have made progress towards the fulfilment 
of their duty to investigate and prosecute conduct 
amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity 
under the Rome Statute, and thereby also addressing 
the forms of conduct underlying the potential cases 
identified by the Office’ (ibid, para. 132). 
21 On the basis of the ICC-OTP’s approach to positive 
complementarity, it notes that it will continue to 
evaluate the situation in Colombia ‘[o]n the basis of the 
available information, and without prejudice to other 
possible crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
which may be identified in the future’ (ICC-OTP, 2019). 
It should be noted that recent political developments 
in Colombia could undermine the functioning of 
JEP, and if so, this could ultimately lead to the start of 
investigations by the OTP and to the exercise of ICC 
jurisdiction in relation to the situation in Colombia; see 
Alsema (2020).
22 In its 2017 Preliminary Examinations report the ICC-
OTP noted that ‘The OTP’s review of the legislation 
adopted by the Colombian Congress found that four 
aspects of the SJP legislative framework may raise 
issues of consistency or compatibility with customary 
international law and the Rome Statute, namely: the 
definition of command responsibility, the definition 
of “grave” war crimes, the determination of “active 
or determinative” participation in the crimes, and 
the implementation of sentences involving “effective 
restrictions of freedoms and rights”’ (ICC-OTP, 2017).
23 See Presentation of the 2019 Annual Report on 
Preliminary Examination Activities, Eighteenth Session 
of the Assembly of States Parties Opening Remarks by 
Ms. Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court. It should be noted that the ICC 
prosecutor held a mission to assess the situation in 
Colombia in January 2020; see ICC-OTP (2020).
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The ICC Jurisdiction Over Environmental 
Damage in the Context of the 
Armed Conflict in Colombia
As was noted above, the ICC does not currently 
have jurisdiction over ecocide or transnational 
environmental crimes in the peacetime context. It 
should be noted that war crimes under Article 8(2)
(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute adopts an eco-centric 
formulation that requires an international attack to 
be committed with the knowledge that it would 
cause ‘widespread, long-term and severe damage 
to the environment which would be clearly exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated’ (emphasis added). It 
should be noted that Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome 
Statute is similar to the grave breach provision of 
Article 85(3)(b) of Additional Protocol I which was 
discussed above, except for the fact that it includes 
‘widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
environment’, whereas the Additional Protocol I 
does not; and it states that loss or damage must 
be ‘clearly’ excessive, while the Additional Protocol 
I does not (Triffterer & Ambos, 2018, 245).
Although the ICC statute does not define 
‘damage to the environment’, some guidance is 
found in other international agreements, even 
though one of the shortfalls of many international 
environmental agreements is that they generally fail 
to define environmental damage (Pereira, 2015). 
It is in the context of war crimes that the ICC OTP 
2016 Policy Paper is expected to be particular-
ly influential in pressing the court to adjudicate 
over crimes committed through environmental 
means and illegal resource exploitation (Pereira, 
2020). It is possible that the court will come to 
clarify not only the scope of ‘environmental’ war 
crime under Article 8 (2)(b)(iv), but also whether the 
illegal exploitation of natural resources in conflict 
situations—such as illegal logging or the destruc-
tion and trafficking of endangered species—could 
amount to ‘pillage’ and therefore to a war crime 
under Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) (van den Herik & Dam-de 
Jong, 2011). The clarification by the court on this 
question would be particularly significant in light of 
a string of Security Council Resolutions recognizing 
the interconnections between the exploitation 
of natural resources and armed conflicts, includ-
ing in the contexts of the conflicts in Sierra Leone 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo.24 In the 
Colombian context, the decision rendered by the 
24 See Resolution 1306 (2003) concerning the illicit trade 
in diamonds during the conflict in Sierra Leone; and 
Medellín Justice and Peace Law (Ley de Justicia y 
Paz-JPL) Tribunal against three paramilitaries high-
lighted a strategy of appropriation and control of 
indigenous territories and natural resources as 
part of a systematic, generalised and/or repetitive 
criminal pattern of forced displacement committed 
by the Pacífico-Héroes de Chocó bloc of the United 
Self-Defences of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas 
de Colombia-AUC) against the Afro-Colombian and 
indigenous communities (ICC-OTP, 2017, para. 137). 
As noted above, the armed conflict significantly 
affected deforestation in the country with cattle 
ranching and illegal timber extraction among its 
main causes (Morales, 2017). Despite this, there is 
still a lack of developed jurisprudence examining 
the connections between international crimes and 
natural resources, and currently no systematic juris-
prudence regarding pillage of natural resources 
(Gilbert 2018, 106; Radics & Bruch 2017).25
Yet because Article 8(2)(b)(iv) and Article 8(2)
(b)(xvi) only apply in cases where environmental 
damage occurs in the course of an international 
armed conflict, they effectively preclude cases 
where environmental damage occurs during peace-
time or in the course of a non-international conflict 
(Mwanza, 2018; Pereira, 2020), as is the case of the 
armed conflict in Colombia. Significantly though, 
Article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Rome Statute enables the ICC 
to prosecute ‘pillaging of town or place, even when 
taken by assault’ for violations of laws and customs 
in armed conflicts that are not international. More-
over, one important development in this context 
is the work of the International Law Commission’s 
Special Rapporteur Ms. Marie G. Jacobsson who 
has addressed certain questions related to the 
protection of the environment in non-internation-
al armed conflicts focusing on how international 
rules and practices concerning natural resources 
may enhance the protection of the environment 
during and after such conflicts.26 Therefore, there 
is a limited legal basis for the ICC OTP to investigate 
Resolutions 1457 (2003), 1856 (2008) and 1952 (2010) 
concerning the DRC. See ibid.
25 Regarding ICC jurisprudence see in particular The 
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda Situation: Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Trial Chamber 
VI, 08 July 2019; Appeals Chamber, Situation in the 
Central African Republic in the Case of the Prosecutor 
V. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 8 June 2018, ICC-01/05-
01/08; Trial Chamber III Situation in the Central African 
Republic in the Case of the Prosecutor V. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, 21 March 2016, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343.
26 See: https://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/8_7.shtml, para. 64, 
[1/12/2020]. 
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the war crime of pillage of natural resources in the 
context of the internal armed conflict in Colombia 
on the basis of Article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Rome Statute, 
even though the OTP’s preliminary examinations 
of the situation in Colombia since 2004 have not 
assessed cases involving environmental damage 
in the context of the internal armed conflict in Co-
lombia to date.27
Beyond the context of war crimes, and until 
there is a formal amendment to the ICC Statute 
to extend the court’s jurisdiction, the only other 
possible avenues for prosecution of environmental 
damage before the ICC would be in the context of 
genocide and crimes against humanity. The poten-
tial ICC prosecution for crimes against humanity and 
genocide is particularly significant as those crimes 
do not need to be committed in the context of an 
international (or internal) armed conflict.
The Rome Statute defines crimes against hu-
manity as acts committed as part of a ‘widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack’ and 
includes murder, extermination, ‘or other inhumane 
acts of similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health’ (ICC-OTP, 1998, art. 7), which could 
include for example water contamination to kill 
a civilian population. But, to what extent could 
environmental damage amount to a crime against 
humanity under the Rome Statute? Firstly, as per 
Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute, the attack to 
the environment would need to endanger human 
health in order to be recognized as a crime against 
humanity, thus it would leave the environment as 
such without effective legal protection. Moreover, 
the Rome Statute requires that the attack be ‘wide-
spread or systematic’. This certainly limits the scope 
of this provision as many instances of environmental 
damage would not meet this condition (Pereira, 
2020; Gray 1996). As for the requirement that the act 
has to be directed at a civilian population, when the 
continuous and foreseeable result of the extraction 
27 The preliminary examinations relating to war crimes 
committed after 1 November 2009 relate to violations 
of article 8(2)(c)(i); article 8(2)(e)(i); article 8(2)(c)(i); 
article 8(2)(c)(ii); article 8(2)(c)(iii); article 8(2)(e)(vi); 
and article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute. See ICC/
OTP (2014), para. 110. Furthermore, the 2011 Decree 
no. 4.633 also known as the ‘Law of the Victims’ (Ley 
de Víctimas) provides the legal basis for the right to 
reparation of indigenous people and communities for 
violations of their rights to land and natural resources 
in the context of the armed conflict in Colombia. See 
Titles III, IV and V of the 2011 Decree no. 4.633.
produces severe environmental damage which 
kills local populations, a policy to continue such 
extraction becomes tantamount to an official policy 
to carry out attacks against a civilian population 
(Sharp, 1999, 239). According to Article 7(2)(a) 
of the Rome Statute, this act must be pursuant to 
‘a State or organizational policy’ to commit such 
attack. The policy does not need to emanate from 
the state since non-state actors such as the para-
military and militia groups operating in Colombia 
who exercise de facto power can constitute the 
entity behind an organizational policy (Triffterer 
& Ambos 2018, 246). With respect to the mental 
element requirement, ‘knowledge of the attack’ is 
the mens rea needed for the establishment of the 
crime against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome 
Statute. This appears to encompass acts committed 
not only with intention but also with recklessness, 
which tends to be the case with a considerable 
number of environmental offences. Yet the ability 
of the OTP to prosecute crimes against humanity 
committed via reckless acts appears to be limited 
considering the history of negotiations of the Rome 
Statute (Schabas, 2011, 236).
In its preliminary examinations, the OTP has 
noted a number of instances of crimes against 
humanity committed against indigenous com-
munities in the context of the armed conflict in 
Colombia falling under the ICC jurisdiction. This 
includes the forceable transfer of populations, 
including indigenous people, as a possible crime 
against humanity (ICC-OTP, 1998, art. 7(1)(d)). The 
internal forced migration in Colombia has led to 
land grabbing in protected areas and significant 
environmental degradation (Morales, 2017). The 
ICC OTP notes that armed groups including FARC, 
ELN and paramilitaries have been identified as 
the main perpetrators of forced displacement in 
Colombia (ICC-OTP, 2012) and stated that there are 
‘reasonable basis to believe that these groups have 
caused displacement for various reasons, including 
the expansion of their strategic military presence, 
securing access routes, and establishing zones of 
political influence’ (ibid, para. 61). Furthermore, 
projects have been implemented with brutal forced 
displacement, mass violence and selected killings 
of indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities 
as their territories are regarded as strategically 
important for armed groups involved in narcotics 
production and trafficking, as well as in the context 
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of newly emerging macro-economic development 
plans (ibid).28
An even higher threshold would be required 
to link environmental damage with acts of genocide 
in violation of the UN 1948 Genocide Convention29 
and Article 6 of the Rome Statute, and thus po-
tentially attracting the jurisdiction of the ICC. Even 
though the implications of this would be significant, 
there would be several legal challenges for an 
incident involving environmental damage, illegal 
natural resource exploitation and land grabbing to 
be classed as genocide. One evidentiary burden 
would be to prove certain elements of the crime of 
genocide which requires specific ‘intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group’ (ICC, 1998, art. 6). In particular, 
even if acts such as ‘killing members of the group’ 
(committed via an environmental medium) could in 
principle meet the actus reus element of the crime 
of genocide, it would still be challenging for the 
ICC prosecutor to establish that an environmental 
offence intended to ‘destroy a group’. Hence it 
has been suggested that defining international 
environmental crimes as crimes against humanity 
could prove more meaningful in that it covers many 
of the same acts that would normally fall under the 
rubric of genocide, but without the higher scien-
ter element of demonstrating a ‘specific intent to 
destroy one ethnic group’ (Sharp, 1999). 
Although preliminary examinations by the ICC 
OTP since 2004 do not include allegations of geno-
cidal acts, it is arguable that some of the activities by 
the Colombian state, paramilitary and militia groups, 
including the systematic and widespread killings 
and displacement of indigenous peoples, could 
warrant investigations for the crime of genocide 
under Article 6 of the Rome Statute. The connec-
tion and inter-dependency between indigenous 
peoples, their lands and natural resources and their 
human right to a healthy environment30 recognized 
28 For example, it was noted that in the case of the 
river basins of Curvarado and Jiguamiando, 3,000 
Afro-Colombians were forcibly displaced from their 
collective territory by paramilitaries, narcotraffickers, 
and those seeking to acquire lands illegally for 
plantations and cattle ranching (ibid).
29 UN Convention on the Prevention and Prohibition of the 
Crime of Genocide, adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of 
the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948, Article 2.
30 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, ‘The 
Environment and Human Rights’ (State obligations 
in relation to the environment in the context of the 
protection and guarantee of the rights to life and to 
personal integrity), interpretation and scope of Articles 
by the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights,31 the JEP judgments to date in 
Cases 02 and 05,32 and the progressive judgment 
of the Colombian Supreme Court on the rights 
of nature as discussed above, could develop the 
basis for prosecutions for the crime of genocide 
(or, eventually, ‘ethnocide’), for the destruction of 
the environment, and the killings and displacement 
of indigenous groups in the context of the internal 
armed conflict in Colombia as long as the intent to 
‘destroy a group’ can be established.
Corporate Accountability for 
Environmental Damage
Currently, the ICC only has jurisdiction over inter-
national crimes committed by individuals, and not 
by states. But another significant limitation of the 
Rome Statute is that it currently does not recognise 
the concept of criminal liability of corporations for 
international crimes (ICC, 1998, art. 25(1)). Although 
there were proposals at the Rome Conference 
that led to the adoption of the Statute to include a 
regime for criminal liability of legal entities, those 
proposals were rejected (Megret, 2011, 225). Hence 
one important limitation of the ICC jurisdiction is 
that it can exercise little scrutiny over the role of 
corporations in international crimes. 
There is indeed considerable evidence of cor-
porate involvement in financing the armed conflict 
and orchestrating crimes in Colombia. The ICC OTP 
noted that Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office 
(Físcalia General de la Nación-FGN) initiated pro-
ceedings against businessmen allegedly involved 
in financing the operations of paramilitary groups 
4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 (15 November 
2017). Series A No. 23. Solicitada por la República de 
Colombia, Medio Ambiente y Derechos Humanos: 
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_23_ing.pdf, 
para 47, 108. See also for the first time in a contentious 
case, IACtHR, Caso Comunidades Indígenas Miembros 
de la Asociación Lhaka Honhat (Nuestra Tierra) vs. 
Argentina (Feb 6, 2020).
31 On the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
addressing violations of indigenous peoples’ human 
rights in the context of extractive industry projects, see 
Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador [2012] 
Inter-Am Court HR (ser C) No 245; Saramaka People 
v Suriname [2007] Inter-Am Court HR (ser C) No 172; 
Sawhoyamaxa [2006] Inter-Am Court HR (ser C) No 146, 
73; Moiwana Community v Suriname [2005] Inter-Am 
Court HR (ser C) No 124; Awas Tingni [2001] Inter-Am 
Court HR (ser C) No 79, 5 [25]. 
32 See https://www.jep.gov.co/Paginas/inicio.aspx 
[1/12/2020].
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operating in different regions of Colombia since at 
least 2002 (ICC-OTP, 2018, para. 151). For example, in 
August 2018, the FGN issued an indictment (in Span-
ish ‘resolución de acusación’) against 13 executives 
and employees of the company Chiquita brands 
(Banadex and Banacol branches) for the alleged 
agreement (‘concierto para delinquir’) to finance 
the Arlex Hurtado paramilitary front which operated 
in the regions of Urabá and Santa Marta from 1996 
to 2004 (ibid). Additionally, in August 2018, the FGN 
ordered the initiation of an investigation against 
cattle businessmen from Córdoba, who reportedly 
acted as links between some businessmen and AUC 
commanders (ibid, para. 152). 
It has been suggested that while the OTP 2016 
Policy Paper will not change the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over corporate crimes, it may encourage the pros-
ecution of business officials, which would be an 
important development from the perspective of 
business and human rights (Bernaz, 2017). In this 
vein, corporate ‘aiding and abetting’ could be part 
of a framework for holding corporate officers ac-
countable for violations of international criminal law 
(ibid). Moreover, the International Law Commission 
has drafted articles on corporate accountability for 
environmental damage in the context of armed 
conflicts which may lead to the progressive de-
velopment and codification of international law 
in this area.33 
Conclusions and Recommendations
It is a daunting task to bring peace to a country 
where the vast majority of people have grown under 
the armed conflict and where millions have suffered 
horrendous injustices. These historic injustices must 
be recognized, and the events of the past must be 
dealt with. The Commission for the Clarification of 
Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition (CEV), the 
Missing Persons Search Unit (UBPD) and JEP have 
an important role to play in the peacebuilding 
process. This includes listening to the victims and 
bringing to justice all sides of the perpetrators who 
committed these crimes. However, one must ask 
33 See Marie G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, Third 
Report on the Protection of the Environment in relation 
to Armed Conflicts, International Law Commission, 
Sixty-eighth session (2016). See also Pereira (2020) and 
the ongoing negotiations of the United Nations Draft 
Business and Human Rights Treaty, https://www.ohchr.
org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/
OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf [1/12/2020]
to what extent this framework is also able to do 
justice to the environmental destruction that took 
place during the armed conflict and that continues 
to take place at an even larger magnitude in the 
wake of the peace agreement.
• JEP has a unique window of opportunity here 
because it opened ‘macro’ cases where local 
communities and indigenous groups are the 
victims. These groups can provide important 
insights into the social impact and rights viola-
tions that took place during the armed conflict, 
and how they perceived the environmental 
damages and crimes against nature that took 
place during the armed conflict. 
• JEP could apply the environmental specific 
articles 35(3) and 55 of the Additional Protocol 
I (as international customary law) for the first 
time and contribute to the interpretation of 
the requirement of widespread, long-term, 
and severe damage to the environment in a 
manner that includes damage occurring as 
a result of conventional warfare in Case 02. 
Furthermore, JEP could apply the general 
protection IHL rules in light of human rights law 
and international environmental law to restrict 
collateral environmental damage during the 
armed conflict. It could also apply international 
human rights law protecting the environment 
on acts that may not be addressed by IHL but 
that remain applicable also during armed 
conflict.
• JEP also has an opportunity to implement Draft 
Principle 5 of the International Law Commis-
sion to ensure respect for indigenous rights, 
not only during the armed conflict but also in 
the post-conflict. The representation of local 
and indigenous people, for instance in Case 
02 and Case 05, can be an example on how 
to address and include the environment as 
a victim in order to work towards a reconcil-
iation not just among people, but also with 
the natural environment. 
• Addressing the environment as a victim could 
be a chance for JEP to combine international 
advocacy encouraging a better legal pro-
tection of the environment with the national 
legal developments taking place in Colombia 
providing legal rights for parts of the envi-
ronment. One might hope that this would 
also carry on outside JEP and into Colombian 
society in order to address and tackle the 
contemporary social-ecological conflicts, 
the ongoing environmental destruction and 
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violence against those who dare to stand up 
against the widespread injustices. After all, 
the environment of Colombia has not only 
been a victim of the armed conflict, but it is 
increasingly also a victim of the post-conflict.
• From the perspective of international criminal 
justice, it is particularly important that JEP 
is able to reconcile the balancing of politi-
cal realities in the country with meeting the 
principles and standards expected under 
international criminal law.
• In the aftermath of the ICC OTP 2016 Policy 
Paper, it is pertinent for civil society, NGOs, 
and other relevant stakeholders to bring to 
the attention of the OTP via communications 
instances of environmental damage, illegal 
natural resource exploitation and land grab-
bing amounting to war crimes under the Rome 
Statute committed after 1 November 2009, 
and to crimes against humanity and genocide 
committed after Colombia’s ratification of the 
Rome Statute in 2002.
• The ICC OTP should continue to collaborate 
with JEP and the Colombian authorities and 
civil society in ensuring the fulfilment of peace 
and reconciliation, so that reparations, remedi-
ation and appropriate punishment are applied 
for violations of indigenous human rights and 
environmental degradation in the context of 
the Colombian armed conflict. In particular, 
the OTP preliminary examinations (and eventu-
al investigations) should assess and prioritise 
cases of allegations of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity or genocide committed in 
Colombia involving serious environmental 
damage, illegal natural resource exploitation 
and land grabbing, in line with the principle of 
positive complementarity and observing the 
implementation of the principles of interna-
tional criminal justice and the Rome Statute.
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